In describing the flawless regularity of developmental processes and the correlation between changes at certain genetic loci and changes in morphology, biologists frequently employ two metaphors: that genes ‘control’ development, and that genomes embody ‘programs’ for development. Although these metaphors have an admirable sharpness and punch, they lead, when taken literally, to highly distorted pictures of developmental processes. A more balanced, and useful, view of the role of genes in development is that they act as suppliers of the material needs (...) of development and, in some instances, as context‐dependent catalysts of cellular changes, rather than as ‘controllers’ of developmental progress and direction. The consequences of adopting this alternative view of development are discussed. (shrink)

Purpose: Understanding the place of Ernst von Glasersfeld's Radical Constructivism (RC), and some of its implications, in the development of epistemology. Design: Characterization of two main options for the content of "knowledge" (without and with belief in mind-independent structures), sketch of their history in occidental thought; comparison of their properties concerning subjectivity, objectivity, second-order cybernetics, reliability of mental tools, and the needs and mechanisms for certainty and overall structures. Findings: Awareness that we structure mental working tools can, as RC suggests, (...) replace belief in mind-independent reality, and this change dissolves the conceptual problem of metaphysics-ontology, but also eliminates the certainty expected from it, which raises the possibility of relativism. Working-concepts cannot be deconstructed because they imply no ontological claims. Subject(s) are necessarily included in all knowledge (which does not mean solipsism): because subjective experience encompasses all mental tools, including those of objectivity and mathematics, while in contrast the subject itself cannot become an objective system. Practical reliability of mental tools differs from subjective certainty, which requires an ontological leap of faith to positive beliefs: for specific tools including automata, and for positive holistic structures. However, in agreement with the constructivist view, holistic views can instead have an unstructured center, with reliability = viability, which prevents relativism. In sum, belief in mid-independent reality is needed for certainty if desired; for all other purposes constructivism is more helpful. Implications: The change in view suggested by von Glasersfeld's work is of relevance for a number of fields of study with conceptual problems (such as the mind-brain relation). However, due to their generality, the implications will need evaluation in specific instances. The question of certainty needs attention for practical reasons. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the target article “Arguments Opposing the Radicalism of Radical Constructivism” by Gernot Saalmann. First paragraph: My remarks are basedon the view that mind-and-world structures of subject-inclusive experience are created by individual and collective subjects, and are not derived from pre-existing subject-exclusive structures structuring; see my papers in CF and the Karl Jaspers Forum). I will comment on two points.

Purpose: To show that the mind--brain relation can be understood from a perspective that keeps the mind at the center. Problem: Since at least the time of Augustine, the puzzle of the mind--brain relation has been how the mind is attached to, or originates from, the body or brain. This is still the prevalent scientific question. It implies assumption of a primary (ontological) subject--object split, and furthermore that subjective experience can be derived from, or even reduced to, a fictitious mind-independently (...) pre-structured reality. This belief in mind-independent reality is closely related to the development and use of language. It in turn means that the mind cannot be real because it cannot be mind-independent and so disappears from discussion, preventing access to the mind--brain question. Solution: The problem requires an epistemology which keeps subjective experience at the center but does not interfere with objective methods. The un-testable proposition of mind-independent structures can be re-formulated as the use of templates for thinking: a method created by humans, a knowable tool, that is, "working" or "as-if" ontology-metaphysics. Truth and reality, including the reality of objective brain activity, then become working tools within ongoing subject-inclusive encompassing experience. Conclusion: The traditional mind--brain puzzle is the result of erroneous premises, and can be replaced by the question: how does working-objective knowledge originate within encompassing experience? This is a novel and contradiction-free approach to studies of the mind--brain relation and related questions. (shrink)

Purpose: This conceptual-epistemological paper deals with the old problem of inversion of thinking, as typified by traditional metaphysics-ontology. It is proposed that a thorough constructivism -- which views structures of mind, nature, and all, as not derived from (not referring to) any pre-structured given mind-independent reality (zero-derivation, 0-D) -- can go beyond this conceptual impasse; it can also serve as a fall-back position for positive ontologies. Practical implications: The practical result of 0-D is that all structures of experience are understood (...) as tools serving individual and collective subjects. Conclusion: This conceptual correction results in a simplification for the understanding of some conceptual puzzles, such as the mind-brain relation, but also in a considerable increase of responsibility, because entities and agents formerly considered responsible, and outside the mind, are recognized to be extensions of the subjects. (shrink)

A trait is robust to a genetic or environmental variable if its variation is weakly correlated with variation in that variable. The source of robustness lies in the fact that the developmental processes that give rise to complex traits are nonlinear. A consequence of this nonlinearity is that not all genes are equally correlated with the trait whose ontogeny they control. Here we explore how developmental mechanisms determine and alter the correlation structure between genes and the traits that they control. (...) A formula is developed by which the correlation of a gene or environmental variable with a trait can be calculated if the mechanism that gives rise to the trait is known. The nature of robustness and the ways in which robustness can evolve are discussed in the context of the problems that arise in the analysis of inherently nonlinear systems. BioEssays 24:553–563, 2002. © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

Early attempts at combining multiple inheritance with nonmonotonic reasoning were based on straightforward extensions of tree-structured inheritance systems, and were theoretically unsound. In The Mathcmat~'cs of Inheritance Systcrns, or TMOIS, Touretzky described two problems these systems cannot handle: reasoning in the presence of true but redundant assertions, and coping with ambiguity. TMOIS provided a definition and analysis of a theoretically sound multiple inheritance system, accom-.

Originally published in 1915, this book presents the content of four lectures delivered by the author at the University of Cambridge from 1914 to 1915, as part of the Hulsean Lectures series. The text discusses the abiding value of Pascal and deals with misconceptions regarding the nature of his work and character. Detailed notes and an authorial preface are also provided. This book will be of value to anyone with an interest in Pascal and his influence on early twentieth-century thought.

A well-known open problem in epistemic logic is to give a syntactic characterization of the successful formulas. Semantically, a formula is successful if and only if for any pointed model where it is true, it remains true after deleting all points where the formula was false. The classic example of a formula that is not successful in this sense is the “Moore sentence” p ∧ ¬BOXp, read as “p is true but you do not know p.” Not only is the (...) Moore sentence unsuccessful, it is self-refuting, for it never remains true as described. We show that in logics of knowledge and belief for a single agent (extended by S5), Moorean phenomena are the source of all self-refutation; moreover, in logics for an introspective agent (extending KD45), Moorean phenomena are the source of all unsuccessfulness as well. This is a distinctive feature of such logics, for with a non-introspective agent or multiple agents, non-Moorean unsuccessful formulas appear. We also consider how successful and self-refuting formulas relate to the Cartesian and learnable formulas, which have been discussed in connection with Fitch’s “paradox of knowability.” We show that the Cartesian formulas are exactly the formulas that are not eventually self-refuting and that not all learnable formulas are successful. In an appendix, we give syntactic characterizations of the successful and the self-refuting formulas. (shrink)

This book is intended for the use of the candid student, devised as a monitory preparation for deeper study of the philosophy of Spinoza. By its means it is hoped that the student may avoid the chief pitfalls of Spinoza-interpretation, and be carried past many of the difficulties encountered by the modern mind in the study of his writings. To this end perhaps the greatest hindrance to be met by the beginner is the ‘popular' exposition that attempts to expound the (...) thought of one age in terms of the favoured categories of another. By providing the necessary safeguards against misinterpretations arising from such causes, the author has sought to awaken interest in the closely knit fabric of Spinoza's doctrine of man and nature and God, and its practical import - and thus to revivify a specimen too long deprived of its native air. (shrink)

Written in debate format, this book covers developing fields such as social cognition, as well as classic areas such as memory, learning, perception and categorization. The links between emotion and memory, learning, perception, categorization, social judgements, and behavior are addressed.

Originally published in 1942, this book constitutes the companion volume to The Heart of Pascal ; both volumes were formed using selections from Pascal's Pensées. The text gathers together a series of selections, presented in French, which illustrate Pascal's Christian faith and thoughts on the relationship between man and God. An appendix and preface by the editor are also provided. This is a highly informative book that will be of value to anyone with an interest in Pascal and his late (...) thought. (shrink)

Mark, G. La crisis de la física clásica por obra del experimento.--Thirring, J. La transformación del sistema conceptual de la física.--Hahn, J. La crisis de la intuición.--Nöbeling, J. La cuarta dimensión y el espacio curvo.--Menger, C. La nueva lógica.

A new challenge for Bible translators A few decades ago the development of the dynamic-equivalent method of translation (which later became known as functional equivalence) broke radically away from the formal and traditional method of translation. Since then the functional-equivalent approach has undergone refinement, but the development can no longer be called revolutionary. However, research in the art of translation has now shifted from the method of translation to the format of the printed text (also called the paralinguistic features of (...) the text). In this article practical examples are given of how the employment of paralinguistic features can underscore the meaning of the text of the Bible, especially the Afrikaans Bible since it has become imperative to start working on a new translation. (shrink)

This paper studies connections between two alternatives to the standard probability calculus for representing and reasoning about uncertainty: imprecise probability andcomparative probability. The goal is to identify complete logics for reasoning about uncertainty in a comparative probabilistic language whose semantics is given in terms of imprecise probability. Comparative probability operators are interpreted as quantifying over a set of probability measures. Modal and dynamic operators are added for reasoning about epistemic possibility and updating sets of probability measures.

By subjecting Nietzsche to a Platonic critique, author William H. F. Altman punctures his “pose of untimeliness” while making use of Nietzsche’s own aphoristic style of presentation. Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche—named for a Prussian King—is thereby revealed to be the representative philosopher of the Second Reich.

In a new approach to a vexing problem in modern philosophy, William H. F. Altman shows that Heidegger’s decision to join the Nazis in 1933 can only be understood in the context of his complicated relationship with the Great War.

This book is part of a bibliographic series on the whole of philosophy by the author. Subsequent volumes will be Philosophy: Its Nature, Methods and Basic Sources and Philosophy: Its Histories, Systems and Specific Settings. The present volume aims at providing "selected and classified bibliographies in the fields of ethics, economics, law, politics, and sociology from the point of view of their relevance to philosophy." It contains a chapter on each of these subjects. Each chapter is in turn divided somewhat (...) as follows: general studies, particular periods and countries, special questions, and periodicals. Each subsection is introduced by a very brief description, when this is appropriate. There is a lengthy index of authors whose works are cited. The work is directed toward English-speaking students and so concentrates on studies in English. It is difficult to evaluate an undertaking of this scope, and one is almost inevitably disappointed when he turns to sections dealing with topics of special interest to him. One example will suffice. Those familiar with the sociology of religion will find that the listings under that heading include no works of Peter Berger, Thomas Luckmann or Thomas O'Dea, that of Weber's works on the sociology of religion only The Protestant Ethic and The Spirit of Capitalism is cited, and that none of the journals devoted to religious studies is mentioned among the specialized sociological periodicals. One cannot help but feel that the scope of this work is too ambitious for one man. Perhaps a collaborative effort or a select bibliography of bibliographies would have been a more feasible venture. On the other hand, this bibliography can, as the author intended, supply the student of philosophy with "selected writings which may lead to other treatises," and it may suggest to him "new fields for inquiry or research."--H. F. (shrink)

In this book, William H. F. Altman argues that it is not order of composition but reading order that makes Euthyphro, Apology of Socrates, Crito, and Phaedo “late dialogues,” and shows why Plato’s decision to interpolate the notoriously “late” Sophist and Statesman between Euthyphro and Apology deserves more respect from interpreters.